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University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
RECEIVED 
3400 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6204 
Telephone 215-898-7060 
Facsimile 215-573-2005 
NOV 12 1992 
ROGER J. MINER 
U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE 
ALBANY NEW YORK 
November 5, 1992 
The Honorable Roger J. Miner 
Martin Mazen Anbari 
Editor-in-Chief 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
P.O. Box 858 
Albany, NY 12201 
Dear Judge Miner: 
I am delighted to hear from Peter Flocos that you have 
agreed to speak at our 1993 annual banquet and that one of our 
suggested dates, March 25, is agreeable to you. 
I write on behalf of the Editorial Board of the University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review to extend to you a formal invitation. 
We will be honored to have you speak at the banquet. 
Attendance at the banquet is by invitation only and has 
traditionally included editors and alumni of the Law Review and 
members of the Law School faculty and the Philadelphia Bar. 
over the next few weeks, the Law Review will be making the final 
arrangements for the banquet; we will keep you posted. 
The Law Review will of course reimburse for all the expenses 
that you might incur in visiting Philadelphia. As the time of 
the banquet draws near, our Managing Editor, Keith Eisner, will 
be in contact with your office to arrange for your travel and 
overnight stay. 
In the meantime, if I can be of any assistance in answering 
questions related to the Law Review and the banquet, please 
contact me at the Law Review. 
Thank you very much. 
Martin Mazen Anbari 
75A 
7Sth Anniversary Dinner 
Cornell Law Review 
Statler Hotel, Ithaca, NY 
March a, 1990 
7:00 P.M. 
Roger J. Miner 
U.S. Circuit Judge 
I salute the editors, staff, alumni and faculty advisors of 
the Cornell Law Review on 75 years of distinguished service to 
the legal community. Since it began publication in 1915, your 
law review has acquired an outstanding reputation, nationally and 
internationally, for the publication of articles, notes and 
comments on the cutting edge of the law. Accurate, timely, well-
researched and well-edited, the pieces published in this law 
review are a tribute to the editors and staff as well as to the 
authors. I know from personal experience that those able 
analyses, dynamic discussions, and comprehensive critiques by the 
contributing authors would never see the light of day without the 
significant student contributions essential to the publication of 
each issue. 
My personal experience was as a Managing Editor, a position 
, that I regard, naturally, as the most important on the staff. 
Jtt~ll~"-
•' ~most ~ U years have passed, ~ I :r.ememller JPY expe1dence wet"l. 
I recall the lead article of my first issue as Managing Editor. 
~~ I~ was written by that great lion of American law, Roscoe Pound, 
then Dean Emeritus of Harvard Law School. The artjcle,~titled ,er 
"The Judicial Process in Action,".came to us in a form all too 
« 
familiar to law review staffers-- all messed up, and with much 
cite and substance work required./ "The Judicial Process in 
Action" --I have returned to 2ha article time and time again 
,u,,,.c~{J 
~~ ~ ·AL_ pfa"W'G-,_ +"' l ;t"-
f~~~ Z.~\ ·~~ q_~CLL. 
1AJ 
during the last ~ years -- not because it has always remained 
interesting, informative and timely -- not because it has 
provided me with valuable insights bearing on my work as a judge 
-- and not because it is a great classic of legal literature.y"I 
have returned to that article repeatedly over the course of ~ 
decades because I never have understood the damn thing~ More 
about the problem of understanding law review articles shortly. 
Incidently, there is a quote from one of Pound's books behind the 
bench in the Cornell Moot Courtroom: "Law must be stable and yet 
it cannot stand still." I understand it but do not consider it 
especially profound. 
1$Ji-. also remember the first student note I was responsible for 
editing. The note seems strangely out of date, since it revolved 
( around a 1954 ruli.· n.9 •of a c. oo.k County, Illinois Superior Court to 
\. 1~ }._l-;L· ~ ~<1-- ~ ,J.... ~1 · 
~the effect that artit14f3l=tJ::minatiot:1 of a wite.by--a man other 
? -, 
than her~.b baanndd c cons.ti itt1uted aqultery and thft,.~he resulting 
1~· ~~ ~ /.-\,_...,..,.._ ""-.. ~~ ,;.c_~-.r ~ 
child was illegitimate.A The note has stuck in my mind all these 
years because I remember the first line of the piece as it was 
handed in. It read: "Artificial insemination has only lately 
come into the public eye." I immediately saw the need for some 
editing on the first lineJ 
According to the Cornell Law School catalogue, "[t]he 
[Cornell Law] Review offers training and experience in legal 
researching, critical analysis and concise writing." It is no 
secret that judges, especially of the federal variety, value 
these skills very highly and invariably hire as their clerks 
2 
people who have served on law reviews. Among my colleagues in 
the Second Circuit, Cornell Law Review members enjoy excellent 
reputations for their superior scholarship as well for their 
writing, analytical and research skills. However, I pause here 
to dispel the widely-held but totally erroneous belief that 
federal judges could not perform their duties without law clerks. 
Although clerks are very helpful to a judge, it would be foolish 
for one with 35 years of experience to accept without question 
the expertise of one who recently completed three years of law 
school. When asked how much I rely on the work of clerks, I 
always remind the questioner of the Biblical story of Methuselah. 
The Bible says that, at the end of his days, Methuselah "leaned 
on his staff and died." 
Besides the honing of research, analytical and writing 
skills, law review membership brings with it the experience of 
collegiality--the opportunity to work with others toward a common 
goal. This is an important experience, valuable to those who 
would work in a judge's chambers or in a law firm or in any other 
legal environment where teamwork is essential. Not the least 
important part of the collegiality of a law review is the 
friendship of your fellow staffers. some of my colleagues from 
law review are still my dearest friends, even after all the time 
that has passed. So will it be with many of you. 
I am told that there is some interest here in the extent to 
which use is made of law reviews in the decisionmaking process, 
particularly in the Federal Appellate decisionmaking process. I 
3 
can only speak from my own experience in this regard. In my 
chambers, we always check to see whether there are any law review 
articles, notes or comments dealing with the subject of the 
decisions we are working on. Very often, authors are kind enough 
to send us reprints of their articles when they see that we are 
considering a case to which their article bears some relevance. 
As I noted earlier, the law clerks ordinarily are law review 
alumni and are in close contact with the law review scene. I 
like to thumb through the major law reviews when I have the 
opportunity. We often cite to law reviews. But we find them 
most useful as compendia--exhaustive and comprehensive 
collections of cases and statutes on particular subjects. I find 
the analyses, conclusions and suggested directions interesting 
but rely on the reviews much less for those purposes. I find the 
authors' conclusions, very often, off the wall, away from the 
mainstream and unpersuasive. But keep them coming! 
Very interesting to me are law review analyses of decisions 
I have written. Not too many authors agree with me when they 
write about my decisions. Either I am wrong most of the time or 
there is some rule against agreeing with a judge. I often feel 
like a playwright who gets bad reviews, and I frequently scribble 
on the articles words like "that's not what I said" or "that's 
not what the case holds." Two years ago, I wrote a decision in a 
Title VII sex discrimination case brought by a man who claimed 
that he was denied promotion to the position of supervising 
respiratory therapist because the man in charge of hiring at the 
4 
hospital preferred the female with whom he was having a romantic 
relationship. I wrote for a unanimous panel that plaintiff had 
not been discriminated against on the basis of his sex within the 
meaning of Title VII. The professor who wrote a 51 page law 
review article entitled "The Meaning of •sex' in Title VII: Is 
Favoring an Employee Lover a Violation of the Act?" apparently 
agreed with my conclusion but not with the way I got there. She 
constructed in her article a "process-oriented framework" for 
dealing with such cases, including what she called a 
"reconstructed prima facie case" approach. It was all very 
elaborate, rich and interesting, but I cannot perceive any 
practical use for the analysis. 
But law reviews are not only for judges and academics. They 
are important to the practicing bar and to those responsible for 
the formulation of legislation. The need for the journals to be 
useful to those segments of the profession ought always to be 
borne in mind. Most useful to all branches of the profession 
were some articles appearing in recent issues of a leading law 
review and dealing with such diverse subjects as the right to 
confrontation in co-defendant confession cases; the definition of 
religion in the first amendment; the "work for hire" provision in 
the Copyright Act; and the regulation of secondary trading 
markets. The same leading journal, however, in an issue that 
included a very worthwhile article on the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
provided an essay on "the influence of emotions under a 
retributive theory of punishment." I read in full the conclusion 
5 
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710 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:655 
chtttee-eHife er death is essentially eatrusted to the moral jucigmeat-
of a few. 
CONCLUSION 
Like most fields of thought, the law has developed its own vo-
cabulary for expressing concepts and promoting values. The lan-
guage of law is the language of rationality, of the cool and the 
deliberative. While this insistence upon rationalistic expression has 
general merit in the elucidation of critical issues, in some instances 
it obscures more than it reveals. Where, as in criminal punishment, 
the influence of emotions is too fundamental to ignore or entirely 
condemn, the law's vocabulary requires expansion to permit emo-
tive discourse. 
Bringing emotions into legal discourse has its risk. We must 
take care that decisionmakers' personal, nonmoral inclinations do 
not substitute for legal principles in the resolution of controversies. 
Thus, where we can devise rules sufficiently determinate to mini-
mize emotional influence, we should do so. When we reach the lim-
its oflaw, when we enter those areas where rules lose their power to 
direct us toward just results, however, recognition of and struggle 
with emotional influence becomes necessary. In these mysterious 
places we need to reconcile thoughts and feelings. 
In the seventeenth century Blaise Pascal wrote in his Pensees: 
"La coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connait [pas.]" 178 The 
heart has its reasons, which reason knows not. In our everyday lives 
we know what is right not only because we think it, but because we 
feel it. It is our challenge as lawyers to make the law see the sense of 
that insight. 
178 B. PASCAL. PENSEES 343 (H.F. Stewart ed. 1950). Pascal also wrote: ''Two ex~ 
cesses: to exclude reason. ro admit nothing but reason." PENSEES 85. ~ 183 (A. Krail~ 
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This is from volume 74 of the Cornell Law Review, of course, 
and I would sum up the article in this way: the influence of 
emotion in criminal punishment is good and bad. But how about 
those last two sentences? "In our everyday lives we know what is 
right not only because we think it, but because we feel it. It 
is our challenge to make the law see the sense of that insight." 
I do not understand those two sentences. The author challenges 
us "to make the law see the sense of (an] insight." I would like 
to accept the challenge, but I do not know what it is. 
I suggest that much of what is written in law reviews is 
unintelligible, and what is not unintelligible is boring and 
repetitious to the point of stupefaction. If I see the word 
"normative" in one more law review article, I shall scream! This 
leads me to a subject of deep interest to me, and I hope to you 
-- the communication crisis in the legal profession. I have been 
concerned for many years with the fact that lawyers of every 
variety are becoming more and more unintelligible to their 
clients, to the courts, to the general public and to each other. 
I even have written, and hopefully will be forgiven for, a law 
review article to be published shortly on the subject. It is 
called "Confronting the Communication Crisis in the Legal 
Profession." 
I think that the legal profession merely reflects a 
communication crisis in the general society. A few days ago, the 
New York Times reported on the failure of communication between 
physician and patient. Our public discourse frequently seems to 
7 
consist of euphemisms. Consider these examples, collected from 
recent newspaper reports: 
* Doctors at a Philadelphia hospital described a patient's 
death as a "diagnostic misadventure of a high magnitude." 
* Five thousand workers at a Chrysler plant found out that 
a new "career alternative enhancement program" meant their plant 
was closing and they were out of jobs. 
* A stockbroker described the October 13th, 1987 stock 
market crash as a "fourth quarter eauity retreat." 
* A United States Senator referred to capital punishment as 
"our society's recognition of the sanctity of human life." 
What I do not understand is why lawyers tolerate doubletalk 
and inarticulateness in speech and writing. Twenty years ago, 
the National District Attorneys Association, of which I was then 
a member, held its annual conference in New York City. During 
the conference, we had a luncheon speaker who was introduced as a 
member of the United Nations legal staff specializing in criminal 
matters. I recognized him as a local comedian and doubletalk 
artist. About ten minutes into his meaningless spiel, a 
prosecutor from Georgia sitting next to me leaned over and said: 
"Ah cain't understand a lot of what thet ol' feller is sayin'." 
I replied: "You can't understand anything of what he is saying, 
because he is speaking doubletalk." "Isn't that somethin'?" he 
said, "Ah just tho't he had a real bad New York accent." 
If communication is defined as expression that is clearly 
and easily understood, much of the written and oral expression of 
8 
the legal profession simply fails to measure up to the 
definition. Inability to communicate afflicts all segments of 
the profession and is now pervasive enough to be classified as a 
crisis. It deserves our attention because the effective 
transmission of information, thoughts, ideas and knowledge is 
essential to the efficient operation of our legal system. 
Ineffective expression in legal discourse diminishes the service 
of the bar, impedes the resolution of disputes, retards legal 
progress and growth and, ultimately, undermines the rule of law. 
The expressive deficiencies of lawyers in their capacities as 
counselors, litigators, adjudicators, legislators and educators 
must be recognized as a serious and growing problem. 
The attorney as counselor is constrained to communicate with 
clients, colleagues and government agencies. Communication with 
clients -- to keep the client informed about the status of a 
case: to comply with requests for information; and to provide an 
explanation of matters sufficient to permit the client to make 
informed decisions -- is an ethical obligation. Yet, failure to 
communicate is near the top of the list of complaints made by 
clients about their lawyers. Very frequently, an irreparable 
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship is occasioned by a 
lawyer's neglect to impart necessary information to a client 
clearly and promptly. Client communication is not merely a 
device for reassuring the client or avoiding fee disputes; it is 
the sine gya non of the service provided by the attorney as 
counselor. 
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Much ink has been spilled in the effort to promote the use 
of plain English by lawyers. Despite all the criticism directed 
at legalese, however, attorneys continue to employ arcane legal 
language when counseling clients. rt is no wonder that clients 
rate lawyers as ineffective communicators and, according to 
surveys, generally will select one lawyer over another on the 
basis of ability to communicate rather than technical competence. 
An all-too-typical example of attorney-client communication 
failure recently surfaced in a New York city newspaper report of 
a pending defamation action brought by a well-known comedian. 
According to the report, the defendant in the case, when 
questioned at a deposition about his $10 million counterclaim for 
services allegedly rendered under a management agreement, said: 
"I don't know what it says and I don't understand it. 11 The 
immediate result of that testimony was the withdrawal of the 
counterclaim, but the long-term result was to reinforce public 
skepticism of the ability of lawyers to communicate. 
The inarticulateness of the bar has brought us to the point 
where law firms must hire public relations counsel, "media 
advisers," "image makers," to speak to the public for them and to 
advise them on how to deal with the press. There was a time when 
some people would refer to a lawyer as a "mouthpiece." How 
surprised they would be to hear a "mouthpiece" speak through 
someone else! One must wonder whether the time is far off when 
an attorney will counsel clients through the medium of a 
"communicator." 
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The widespread use of legal jargon in discourse with clients 
is sometimes attributed to bad motives on the part of the bar --
escalation of fees, self-promotion and deception. One 
commentator has posited "[i]nertia, incompetence, status, power, 
cost and risk" as "a formidable set of motivations to keep 
legalese." My own experience has been that only inertia and 
incompetence drive the excessive use of lawyerisms and legalese 
in counseling clients and drafting legal instruments. Inertia is 
represented by the use of the same forms, form books, buzz words, 
precedent, methods and practices over the years. Incompetence in 
expression now permeates the profession because of deficiencies 
in the early education of young lawyers. Modern education seems 
to provide an insufficient foundation in English grammar, style 
and usage. As a law teacher, I have been astounded by some of 
the inadequacies in written and oral expression demonstrated by 
the brightest students. It should come as no surprise to 
educators that lawyers increasingly are unable to communicate 
with clients. 
The communication skills of those who initiate lawyer-to-
lawyer transmissions also have been found wanting in recent 
years, especially in respect of legal memoranda for internal law 
firm use. The lack of directness and excessive formalism of 
expression that characterize poorly written correspondence as 
well as inadequate legal memos are said to be especially apparent 
among young lawyers. Elimination of "incomprehensible muddles" 
in lawyer-to-lawyer discourse will facilitate the work of 
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counselors and redound to the benefit of clients. 
Essential to every litigator is clarity of speech in 
courtroom discourse. Yet trial judges frequently are heard to 
complain of the inability of courtroom lawyers to communicate 
with witnesses, juries and the bench itself. 
The stilted language of the law has no place, of course, in 
the questioning of witnesses or in the persuasion of juries. In 
my opinion, the expressive deficiencies noted in trial lawyers 
are for the most part simply attributable to their lack of trial 
experience. 
Inexperienced litigators frequently have communication 
problems during the direct examination of witnesses because they 
are unable to pose a question that will elicit an answer relevant 
and material to the case or because they just confuse the 
witness. Take these actual examples collected by a Court 
Reporter: 
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Q. Doctor, did you say he was shot in the woods? 
A. No, I said he was shot in the lumbar region. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Johnson, how was your first marriage 
terminated? 
A. By death. 
Q. And by whose death was it terminated? 
Q. What is your name? 
A. Ernestine McDowell. 
Q. And what is your marital status? 
A. Fair. 
Q. What happened then? 
A. He told me, he says, "I have to kill you because 
you can identify me." 
Q. Did he kill you? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you married? 
A. No, I am divorced. 
Q. What did your husband do before you divorced him? 
A. A lot of things that I didn't know about. 
Q. At the time you first saw Dr. McCarthy, had you 
ever seen him prior to that time? 
Q. Now I am going to show you what has been marked as 
plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you recognize 
the picture. 
A. John Fletcher. 
Q. That's you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were present when the picture was taken, 
right? 
Q. Mr. Jones, is your appearance this morning pursuant 
to a subpoena which was served upon you? 
A. No. This is how I dress when I go to work. 
Q. And lastly, Gary, all your responses must be oral. 
Okay? What school do you go to? 
A. Oral. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. oral. 
As a long-time observer of the litigation scene, it seems to 
me that the communication crisis has affected appellate advocacy 
even more than trial advocacy. Appellate advocacy comes in two 
parts -- Briefs and Oral Arguments -- and its sole object is the 
persuasion of appellate judges. In my experience, it is the rare 
briefwriter who seizes the opportunity to employ the clarity, 
simplicity and directness of expression necessary to endow a 
Brief with maximum persuasive force. 
If there is a failure of communication in brief-writing, 
there is an even greater failure in the other part of appellate 
advocacy oral argument. While litigators will engage in the 
most meticulous preparations for trial, it often seems that the 
same attorneys have not prepared at all for the argument of an 
( appeal. Among the best oral communicators I have heard are law 
'c 
students in appellate moot court competitions that I have judged. 
The students express themselves effectively because they are 
prepared to do so by reason of study and practice. Deficiency in 
oral expression is more and more noticeable as most litigators, 
ignoring the opportunity to engage in a Socratic dialogue with 
the judges about their cases, approach oral argument as if they 
really would have preferred to "submit." It is still a great 
pleasure to see and hear the interchange between British 
barristers and the appeals court judges before whom they argue. 
That interchange is characterized by a clarity of expression that 
is the envy of American appellate judges. 
Those who adjudicate controversies need to communicate with 
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various audiences. Judges who preside at trials must express 
themselves in a way that can be understood by counsel, witnesses 
and the parties appearing before them. Appellate judges must be 
clear and concise in their questions during oral argument and 
must render written opinions that are comprehensible as 
resolutions of disputes at hand and as precedents for future 
cases. Magistrates, referees, administrative law judges, 
arbitrators, special masters, examiners and all those who perform 
adjudicatory functions of any kind must bring perspicuity to 
their endeavors. 
Of all the communicative functions of the trial judge, jury 
instruction is probably the most important and the most 
difficult. Jury comprehension studies generally confirm that 
jurors do not understand many of the instructions given to them. 
Efforts have been undertaken to draft pattern jury instructions 
that will be meaningful to jurors. Other experiments have been 
conducted in an effort to improve juror comprehension, including 
the use of tape recordings and the furnishing of written copies 
of the charge. Much more remains to be done but, in the final 
analysis, jury comprehension of the court's instructions is the 
responsibility of the judge instructing. Judges of course must 
express fairness and impartiality in both speech and demeanor 
when presiding at trials, and that expression represents the 
ultimate communication of the trial judge. 
It is the written opinion in which the skills of the 
adjudicator find their most perfect (or imperfect) expression. 
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According to one teacher of judicial writing, adjudicators share 
common goals in desiring their written opinions "to be clear, 
concise, precise and complete, fair, reasonable, just, balanced 
and dignified" in order to serve a number of purposes: "to 
decide, dispose of and record cases; persuade, exhort, order, 
teach, inform, explain and reason with audiences ranging in legal 
expertise from litigants and the media to courts of appellate 
review." A tall order indeed! As a communicator, the 
adjudicator can do no better than to remember Justice Cardozo's 
admonition that the "sovereign virtue for the judge is 
clearness." I have formulated my own admonition: Simplify, 
clarify and edify in all forms of legal expression. 
Those in the legal profession whose responsibility it is to 
formulate and draft legislation often are faulted for fuzziness 
of language. Indeed, every lawyer has had to wrestle, at one 
time or another, with statutes, especially of the tax variety, 
that are tantamount to incomprehensible. 
It seems beyond cavil, however, that legislative bodies know 
what plain English is. Many states have adopted laws requiring 
the use of plain English in consumer contracts, insurance 
policies and similar documents; Congress itself has adopted a 
number of statutes containing plain English requirements. 
It can be said that legislator-lawyers have, by attention to 
plain language laws affecting consumers, recognized the depth of 
the communication crisis more than any other branch of the 
profession. We can only hope that this concern for plain 
15 
language will extend to other types of legislation as well. 
Law students comprise the primary audience for legal 
educators. The secondary audience is comprised of the practicing 
bar, other academics and the general public, including those 
interested in the books and learned articles of law professors. 
There is evidence of a growing estrangement between the 
professors and their primary audience. Some law teachers are 
becoming less interested in teaching professional skills and 
professional subjects than in interdisciplinary studies and other 
academic pursuits. A recent newspaper dispatch described a 
certain law professor as "one of the most sought-after legal 
academics in the country" by reason of his expertise in dispute 
management in Medieval Icelandic society. 
But even more serious than the failure of the professors to 
communicate with their students is their failure to teach 
communication. Thus do law students fail to acquire the oral and 
written skills necessary for the survival of the profession. 
Comprehension also suffers. A government agency recently 
published a notice of legal positions available to recent law 
graduates. The notice required the submission of writing samples 
with the applications for employment. A large number of 
applications were accompanied by handwriting samples. The 
misuse, abuse, and incomprehensibility of language represents a 
true crisis for us, because language is, after all, the medium in 
which the profession conducts its business. 
The bar is constrained to communicate with such diverse 
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audiences as clients, colleagues, judges, witnesses, juries, 
administrative bodies, law students, academicians and the public 
at large. Of-the deterioration of the abilities of lawyers --
counselors, litigators, adjudicators, legislators and educators -
- to communicate with these audiences, there can be no doubt. I 
urge you to join me in focusing the attention of the bench and 
bar on the critical problem of legal communication. Such an 
effort, accomplished on your part through the publication of 
articles or a symposium issue, would be in the same tradition of 
service that has characterized the Cornell Law Review for three-
quarters of a century. Having now had the opportunity to meet 
with all of you, I am confident that the tradition will endure 
and that your future will be even more glorious than your past. 
Happy 75th Birthday, and Thank You. 
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